Industrial Organization

Series
Pearson
Author
John Lipczynski / John Goddard / John O.S. Wilson  
Publisher
Pearson
Cover
Softcover
Edition
5
Language
English
Total pages
840
Pub.-date
June 2017
ISBN13
9781292121710
ISBN
1292121718
Related Titles



Description

This text enables a thorough and coherent understanding of the core concepts and key topics of industrial organization using a firmly real-world and case-centric approach.

Industrial organization draws upon contributions from a variety of fields of economic inquiry including game theory, information theory, organization theory, agency theory, and transaction cost analysis, as well as the related field of strategic management.

Features

·  The style of presentation is non-technical throughout. No knowledge of calculus is required and no knowledge of statistics or econometrics is assumed.

·  Clear and comprehensive coverage of all major theoretical and empirical topics in industrial economics prepares students to better apply relevant economic theory.

·  A wealth of up-to-date case study material.

·  Extensive coverage of empirical research related to market structure, strategy and firm performance provides an invaluable springboard for readers wishing to pursue the subject at a higher level.

·  Written from a European perspective, focusing wherever possible on European Business and Industry.

·  For those readers requiring a more rigorous treatment of certain topics, a Mathematical Methods appendix provides formal derivations (using calculus) of a selection of the most important theories and results presented in the main text.

·  There is also a primer in the fundamentals of regression analysis in an Econometric Methods appendix providing a brief and non-technical introduction to some of the basic tools, such as regression coefficients, t-statistics and goodness-of-fit.  

New to this Edition

·    A chapter on game theory

·    A new section on international diversification

·    Revised case studies

·    Coverage of recent empirical literature

·    A new set of quantitative problems with solutions

·    Revised questions for discussion at the end of each chapter

Table of Contents

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

 

Part I:  Theoretical Foundations

1 Industrial organization: an introduction

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Static and dynamic views of competition

1.3 The structure–conduct–performance paradigm

1.4 Strategic management: a short diversion

Discussion questions

Further reading

2 Production, costs, demand and profit maximization

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Production and costs

2.3 Demand, revenue, elasticity and profit maximization

2.4 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

3 The neoclassical theory of the firm

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The neoclassical theory of the firm: historical development

3.3 Theories of perfect competition and monopoly

3.4 Efficiency and welfare properties of perfect competition and monopoly

3.5 Theory of monopolistic competition

3.6 Summary

Discussion questions

4 Managerial and behavioural theories of the firm

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Critique of the neoclassical theory of the firm

4.3 Separation of ownership from control: managerial theories of the firm

4.4 The behavioural theory of the firm

4.5 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

5 Transaction costs, agency and resource-based theories of the firm

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Coasian firm

5.3 Transaction costs and the theory of the firm

5.4 Agency theory

5.5 Property rights and the theory of the firm

5.6 The resource-based theory of the firm

5.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

6. Corporate governance

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Agency problems and the need for corporate governance

6.3 Instruments of corporate governance

6.4 Corporate governance codes of practice

6.5 Corporate governance: implementation and empirical evidence

6.6 Business ethics

6.7 Corporate social responsibility

6.8 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

 

Part II:  Structural Analysis of Industry

7 Oligopoly: non-collusive models

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Interdependence, conjectural variation, independent action and collusion

7.3 Models of output determination in duopoly

7.4 Models of price determination in duopoly

7.5 The kinked demand curve and models of price leadership

7.6 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

8 Oligopoly: collusive models

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Collusive action and collusive forms

8.3 Collusive institutions

8.4 Profit-maximizing models of price and output determination for a cartel

8.5 Other motives for collusion

8.6 Factors conducive to cartel formation

8.7 Influences on cartel stability

8.8 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

9 Game Theory

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Dominnce and Nash Equilibrium

9.3 The prisoner’s dilemma game

9.4 Mixed strategies

9.5 Sequential Games

9.6 Repeated Games

9.7 Summary

10 Concentration: measurement and trends

10.1 Introduction

10.2 Market and industry definition

10.3 Official schemes for industry classification

10.4 Measures of seller concentration 10.5

Interpretation of concentration measures

10.6 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

11 Determinants of seller concentration

11.1 Introduction 11.2

Seller concentration: systematic determinants

11.3 The random growth hypothesis

11.4 Trends in concentration and the location of industry

11.5 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

12 Barriers to entry

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Types of barrier to entry

12.3 Entry-deterring strategies

12.4 Signalling commitment

12.5 Potential entry and contestability 12.6

Entry and industry evolution

12.7 Empirical evidence on entry

12.8 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

13 Market structure, firm strategy and performance

13.1 Introduction

13.2 Empirical tests of the SCP paradigm

13.3 Strategic groups

13.4 Sources of variation in profitability: industry, corporate and business unit

effects

13.5 The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO)

13.6 The persistence of profit

13.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

 

Part III:  Analysis of Firm Strategy

14 Pricing

14.1 Introduction

14.2 Cost plus pricing

14.3 Price discrimination 14.4

Peak-load pricing

14.5 Transfer pricing

14.6 Price dispersion

14.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

15 Auctions

15.1 Introduction

15.2 Auction formats and models of bidders’ valuations

15.3 The pure common value model and the winner’s curse

15.4 Optimal bidding strategies and revenue equivalence in the independent private

values model

15.5 Extensions and additional topics in auction theory

15.6 Empirical evidence

15.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

16 Product differentiation

16.1 Introduction

16.2 Types of product differentiation

16.3 Monopolistic competition revisited: the socially optimal amount of product

differentiation

16.4 Lancaster’s product characteristics model

16.5 Hotelling’s location model

16.6 Salop’s location model

16.7 Summary

Discussion questions Further

reading

17 Advertising

17.1 Introduction

17.2 Determinants of advertising expenditure

17.3 Advertising and product characteristics

17.4 Advertising and profit maximization

17.5 Advertising as a barrier to entry

17.6 Advertising, information search and quality signalling

17.7 Is there too much advertising?

17.8 Empirical evidence

17.9 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

18 Research and development

18.1 Introduction

18.2 Market structure, firm size and the pace of technological change

18.3 Investment in research and development

18.4 Diffusion

18.5 Patents

18.6 Empirical evidence

18.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

19 Horizontal mergers and strategic alliances

19.1 Introduction

19.2 Profit-maximizing motives for horizontal mergers

19.3 Non-profit- maximizing motives for horizontal mergers

19.4 Merger waves

19.5 Strategic alliances

19.6 Horizontal mergers: some empirical evidence

19.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

20 Vertical integration

20.1 Introduction

20.2 Motives for vertical integration: enhancement of market power

20.3 Motives for vertical integration: cost savings

20.4 Vertical disintegration

20.5 Empirical evidence on vertical integration

20.6 Agency and vertical relationships

20.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

21 Vertical restraints

21.1 Introduction

21.2 Motives for vertical restraints

21.3 Forms of vertical restraint

21.4 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

22 Network goods and services

22.1 Introduction

22.2 Demand for a network product or service

22.3 Market equilibrium price and quantity for a network good or service:

perfect competition and monopoly

22.4 Market equilibrium price and quantity for a network good or service:

duopoly

22.5 Forms of competition over standardization and compatibility

22.6 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

23 Diversification

23.1 Introduction 23.2

Types of diversification 23.3

Motives for diversification

23.4 Corporate focus and deconglomeration

23.5 Empirical evidence

23.6 The Multinational Enterprise

23.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

 

Part IV:  Analysis of Public Policy

24 Competition policy

24.1 Introduction

24.2 Competition policy: theoretical framework

24.3 Elements of competition policy

24.4 Implementation of competition policy

24.5 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

 

Appendices: Analytical Tools

Appendix 1 Mathematical methods

Appendix 2 Econometric methods

Appendix 3 Solutions to quantitative questions

Glossary

Bibliography

Index

Back Cover

Fifth Edition

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Competition, Strategy and Policy

John Lipczynski  John O.S. Wilson    John Goddard

 

Industrial Organisation: Competition, Strategy, Policy provides a thorough treatment of the core concepts and theories underlying the economics of industrial organization.

 

In this new fifth edition, the authors use an array of empirical examples and case studies to analyse the structure, behaviour and performance of firms and industries.

 

New to this edition:

·    A chapter on game theory

·    A new section on international diversification

·    Revised case studies

·    Coverage of recent empirical literature

·    A new set of quantitative problems with solutions

·    Revised questions for discussion at the end of each chapter

  

Dr John Lipczynski is retired from the University sector. He contributes to the teaching and development of Executive MBA programmes in the private sector.

 

Professor John O.S. Wilson is Professor of Banking & Finance and Director of Research in the Management School at the University of St Andrews. He is Director for the Centre for Responsible Banking & Finance. His research interests include industrial organization and banking.

 

Professor John Goddard is Professor of Financial Economics and Deputy Head of Bangor Business School at Bangor University. His research interests include industrial organization, banking and the economics of professional football.

 

Author

Dr John Lipczynski is retired from the University sector. He contributes to the teaching and development of Executive MBA programmes in the private sector.

 

Professor John O.S. Wilson is Professor of Banking & Finance and Director of Research in the Management School at the University of St Andrews. He is Director for the Centre for Responsible Banking & Finance. His research interests include industrial organization and banking.

 

Professor John Goddard is Professor of Financial Economics and Deputy Head of Bangor Business School at Bangor University. His research interests include industrial organization, banking and the economics of professional football.